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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 970411-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1988), this Court
held that a supplemental verdict-urging instruction to a jury
that has begun deliberations was proper if the language was not
inherently coercive or coercive under the specific circumstances
of the case.

The language of the jury instruction in this case

was coercive per

se because the court admonished the jury that

they had to render a verdict.

The instruction was also coercive

under the specific circumstances of the case

because of the lack

of counterbalancing instructions and because deliberations after
the instruction resulted in a guilty verdict after a mere five
minutes.

Accordingly, the defendant asserts that the

supplemental instructions given by the trial court were coercive
and asks this Court to reverse his convictions.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE PER SE
Rule 19 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits
appellate review for erroneous instructions if an objection was
made at trial or "in order to avoid a manifest injustice."
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 19(c)(1982).

In the present case, the defendant

was not given the opportunity to object to the jury instructions
because the trial court invited the jury into the courtroom and
commenced the instructions without warning the defendant.
This Court in State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App.
1988) held that "[w]here counsel is not aware of the contents of
such an instruction, failure to object to it prior to its being
given to the jury should not bar consideration of the charge on
appeal."

Appellee has conceded that this matter is properly

before the court pursuant to the holding in Lactod (Br. Of
Appellee at 2 ) . Accordingly, this Court should review the trial
court's use of verdict-urging instruction to the jury in the
present case.
The instructions that are in dispute are as follows:
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now in the matter of
State versus Steven Clements. Both counsel are present, as
is Mr. Clements. We have invited the six members of the
jury to come into the court. Members of the jury, have you
been able to arrive at a verdict? And who is your
foreperson?
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be.
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THE COURT: Okay, then. Mr. Hall, you are the
foreperson, and has the jury been able to arrive at a
verdict on each count, sir?
THE COURT: Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has been
deliberating approximately two hours. It would be my
proposal that we recess at this time. We have this calendar
every Wednesday at 1 o'clock. If you can't reach a verdict
this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday,
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while
you're in the jury room. Then you can take as long as you
need to to arrive at a verdict.
Do you think that will be worthwhile? Or if you think
that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you
can tell me that also. If you just don't think you can
unanimously agree on a verdict on each count.
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in for two
minutes.
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that, then. We will
have you brought back out in five minutes, then. If you
can't then we will have to figure out something else to do.
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this
evening. This is not a complicated case. There's only one
real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or
"no." You have to make up your minds, folks. So we'll have
you brought out again in five minutes, then.
(Transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39).
The trial court's instructions are in the form of an "Allen
charge" or a verdict-urging instruction that was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492, 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896).

In Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, this Court

upheld the non-coercive use of Allen charges.

However, this

Court also recognized that although Allen charges are
permissible, they must not be coercive per se or coercive under
the specific circumstances of the case.
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The coercive potential of Allen charges threatens the
principle of law that "[e]very defendant in a federal criminal
case has the right to have his guilt found, if found at all, only
by the unanimous verdict of a jury of his peers." U.S. v. Thomas,
449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Circuit 1971).

The D.C. Circuit asserted

that "[a]ny undue intrusion by the trial judge into this
exclusive province of the jury is error of the first magnitude."
id. at 1181.
The supplemental jury instruction in the present case was
coercive per
verdict.

se because the court insisted that the jury reach a

In Lactod, this Court asserted that "there are certain

inherently coercive ideas which should not be included in an
Allen charge."

761 P.2d at 31.

Furthermore, "[t]he United

States Supreme Court [has] expressly disapproved an instruction
which stated, in part that

x

[y]ou have got to reach a decision in

this case.' Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446, 85 S.Ct. at 1060." Lactod,
761 P.2d at 31.
The D.C. Circuit in Thomas similarly contended that "in
much the same category is the admonition in this case that "you
have ought to be able to agree on a verdict." 449 F.2d at 118283.

The court found that "[s]tatements of this sort reflect the

judge's assessment that the factual issues bear relatively easy
resolution, and pressure jurors, who in their own endeavors have
not found it so, to come to some result at all costs."
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Id.

In the present case, the trial court used language that was
inherently coercive.

The court told the jury that "I would

sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this evening.
is not a complicated case.

This

There's only one real issue here on

the one count, and it's either 'yes' or 'no.'

You have to make

up your minds, folks" (Tr. at 139). The court's insistence that
the jury "make up [their] minds" and decide "yes" or "no" had the
effect of instructing the jury to reach a verdict.
The trial court's statement that "This is not a complicated
case" reflected the court's opinion that facts were easily
determined and placed improper pressure on the jurors(Tr. at
138).

The statements of the court instructed the jury that it

had to reach a decision and were coercive per se.
Appellee contends that it is proper to instruct a nondeadlocked jury that they must return a verdict (Appellee's brief
at 16-18).

However, the Third Circuit insisted that demanding a

verdict is never appropriate.

In U.S. v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d

407, 416 (3rd Cir. 1962), the court responded to the Allen charge
given by the trial judge to the jury before jury deliberations by
asserting that:
So long as the unanimous verdict is required in
criminal cases, there will always be three possible
decisions of the jury:
(1) not guilty of any charge;
(2) guilty of one or more counts of the indictment; and
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(3) not verdict because of a lack of unanimity.
The possibility of a hung jury is as much a part of our
jury unanimity schema as are verdicts of guilty or not
guilty. And although dictates of sound judicial
administration tend to encourage the rendition of
verdicts rather than suffer the experience of hung

juries, nevertheless, it is a cardinal
principle
of law
that a trial
judge may not coerce a jury to the
extent
of demanding that they return a verdict''
(emphasis
added).
This Court in Lactod also stated that a supplemental
instruction "^should not overemphasize the importance of an
agreement, suggest any juror surrender his independent judgment,
or say or do anything from which the jury could possibly infer
that the court is indicating anxiety for or demanding some
verdict, or subjecting the jury to the hardships of long
deliberations.'" Lactod, 761 P.2d at 32 (quoting State v. Thomas,
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959)) (emphasis added).
The court in this case expressed its anxiety for a verdict
by urging the jury to "make up [their] minds" and by stating that
he sincerely hoped that the jury would reach a verdict that
evening (Tr. at 138-9).
In Powell v. U.S., 297 F.2d 318, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1961), the
court found prejudicial error in the trial court's admonishment
"that if the jury remembered the evidence and heeded the charge
of the court, it ought to be able to agree upon a verdict."
court maintained that the charge "is not supported by any law
which is brought before us." id. at 320-21.

6

In this case the

The

judge made a similar charge by insisting that the case was not
complicated and that there was only one issue, which could be
answered by "yes" or "no" (Tr. at 138-9).

Accordingly, the

defendant maintains that the coercive language of the court
placed pressure on the jury to return a verdict.

The prejudice

created against the defendant by the coercive instruction
requires reversal by this Court.

POINT II
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE COERCIVE UNDER THE SPECIFIC
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
Supplemental charges to juries are also reviewed under the
specific circumstances for an improper coercive effect. Jenkins
v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam), State v.
Lactod,761 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1988).

The circumstances and

context of the Allen charge in this case demonstrate that the
charge was coercive.

The factors that the Lactod court

considered included "any colloquy between the judge and jury
foreman, circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction,
and American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice
Relating to Trial by Jury." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31.
A colloquy that a judge found to be prejudicial occurred in
Brvan v. State, 280 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. App. 1973).

Chief Judge

Rawls specially concurred in the decision because he did not
agree with the majority that the use of the Allen charge was
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always prejudicial. Id.

He maintained that the "facts

surrounding the giving of the charge must be considered." Id.
Chief Judge Rawls found that the colloquy between the judge
and the jury, which was given a few minutes after the jury had
begun deliberations again after receiving the Allen charge,
established prejudice.

The colloquy is as follows:

THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury do you
believe that you can arrive at a verdict in a short period
of time?
JUROR: I believe we're closer to it than we were.
have that idea.

I

THE COURT: If I give you another 20 minutes, will that
be enough? You want to give it a try for 20 minutes?
JUROR: All right.
THE COURT: All right. We'll give you another 20
minutes and see if you can arrive at a verdict within the
next 20 minutes. You can retire to the jury room/ 7
Bryan, 280 So.2d at 27.

Seventeen minutes after this exchange,

the jury returned its guilty verdict.

id.

Chief Judge Rawls

asserted that these facts persuaded him to determine that the
Allen charge constituted prejudicial error.

Id.

The colloquy of that case bears a striking resemblance to
the colloquy in the present case.

In this case the judge asked

the judge whether they would not be able to reach a verdict that
evening and would like to reconvene in a week (Tr. at 138). The
jury foreman replied "Some of us think we should go back in for
two minutes."

The court then excused the jury for five minutes
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(Tr. at 138).

The exchange between the judge and the jury

foreman was similar to the colloquy that Chief Judge Rawls found
to be prejudicial in Bryan.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861
(Utah 1992), found that the verdict-urging instruction at issue
case

there was not coercive under specific circumstances of the
that are not present in this case.

In Brown, the court found

that the instruction was not coercive because the "charge was
given prior to jury deliberations and the instruction
specifically directed the jurors not to give up their own
conscientious conclusions".
The present case can be distinguished from Brown because the
instructions were not given prior to jury deliberations.1

They

were given two hours after jury deliberations had begun.

Also,

in this case, the judge failed to counterbalance the verdicturging with the specific instruction for the jurors to not give
up their own conscientious conclusions.
The court in Lactod also considered comments that
counterbalanced a verdict-urging instruction as a factor in
determining whether the instruction was coercive. Lacjtod, 761
P. 2d at 30-31.

In Lactod, the trial judge counterbalanced

The American Bar Association also recommends that verdicturging instructions are given before the jury retires for
deliberation. American Bar Association Standards Relating to Trial
by Jury, §5.4(a).
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statements that indicated he and the jury had spent a lot of time
on the case and that he did not have another day to spend on the
case with statements that encouraged jurors to hold on to their
conscientiously held beliefs, id. at 31.

Counterbalancing

statements are not present in the instructions of this case.

The

court simply instructed the jury to make up their minds and then
dismissed them.
The court in Lactod also observed that the jury deliberated
for another hour and fifteen minutes after receiving the
instruction.

The court considered the length of time as one of

the circumstances to evaluate in assessing whether the
instruction was coercive. 761 P.2d at 31.

The jury in the

present case took only five minutes after the instruction to
return a verdict in contrast to the jury in Lactod.2
Another circumstance that the Lactod court noted was the
absence of a threat to keep the jury deliberating for an
unreasonable length of time. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31.

In the

present case, the trial court recommended that the jury

2

Although Appellee contends that five minutes indicate the
jury was very close to a verdict when the court interrupted
deliberations, this is not supported by the facts (Appellee's brief
at 15) .
The jury did not indicate that they were close to a
verdict when they were called back in. The foreperson just said
that "some of us think that we should go back in for two minute.''
(T. at 138) . Appellee also contradicts the assertion that the
short deliberation time suggests the jury was close to a decision
prior to the Allen charge by later stating that "there is no way of
knowing how close to, a verdict the jury was when they were called
in." (Appellee's brief at p. 22).
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deliberate for an indefinite amount of time (Tr. at 138). The
court in this case proposed that the jury recess and reconvene a
week later to deliberate for "as long as [the jury needed] to to
arrive at a verdict." (Tr. at 138). The court in Fields v.
State, 487 P.2d 831, 839 (Alaska 1971), asserted that "[f]or a
jury to be faced with the prospect of indefinite service is so
inherently and invariably coercive as to require reversal."
The State contends that the trial court's statements were
administrative in nature, such as the statements in Andrews v.
State, 794 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1990).

However,

Andrews is distinct from the present case because the
communication of the court in Andrews to the jury regarded
practical arrangements for overnight accommodations.3

The

instructions in that case "did not amount to an additional
instruction upon the law or some phase of the case." Ld. at 48.
The court in the present case did instruct the jury on the law

3

The trial court submitted the following written communication
to the jury:
"The law of Texas provides that once the Court's
charge has been presented to the jury, the jury can no longer
separate until it has been discharged. Unfortunately, Bowie County
does not have accomodations (sic) for jurors to remain overnight.
The Bailiff will give each of you a pad upon you which you
will please list the one you wish to contact and any articles you
may want the sheriff to secure for you at your homes.
Again, unfortunately, I have trials scheduled for tomorrow and
we may not be able to resume until Monday. So, in completing your
list, please take this into consideration so that the sheriff can
take care of your needs in one trip, if possible." id. at 47-8.
11

and even asserted that "[t]here's only one real issue on the one
count, and it's either

x

yes' or 'no'" (Transcript at 138-9).

The specific circumstances of this case, which include the
colloquy between the judge and the jury, the lack of
counterbalancing instructions, the short length of jury
deliberations following the charge, and the threat to the jury of
deliberating for an indefinite amount of time, support the
conclusion that the instruction was coercive.

For the foregoing

reasons, the conviction of Appellant should be reversed.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Clements asks this Court to reverse his conviction for
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Open Container because
the trial court's Allen instruction to the jury was both coercive
per

se and coercive under the specific circumstances of this

case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

iC

day of May, 1998.

Margaret P. Lindsay/
Counsel for Clements
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